THE New Republic

Have the Opinions of Scientists Endangered Our National Defense?

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New Light on the LATTIMORE CASE

"Toward the end, they say, Pat McCarran lost his enthusiasm for Roy Cohn, but by then the damage had been done. Perhaps, had he lived a little longer, McCarran might have talked a little more freely about what he and Cohn decided that summer, and we would now understand better how the Lattimore case began. But we do know enough today to come much closer to the truth than we could six months ago."



DECEMBER 27, 1954

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T. R. B.

★

Washington Wire

President Eisenhower came into the press conference one minute late, wearing brown tie and double-breasted brown suit. He was tanned, courteous, dignified, attractive, massive, more articulate than Truman, more distant than FDR, outwardly the picture of health. Health is important, for if Ike doesn't run in 1956 it must be for health, his or Mamie's. No other excuse would be acceptable to Republicans: if a President won't run on his own record how can any other party member successfully run on it? Ike would prefer to pull out in 1956, but, as we say, he looks healthy.

The press conference followed two days with Congressional leaders. These looked to the new year, the first day with Republicans on domestic matters, the second with Republicans and Democrats on foreign affairs. When the Democrats left it was evident harmony had broken out all over. Ike and the Democrats on foreign affairs were, it appeared, just like *that*. Pundit Lippmann, whose poignant love-affair with Ike ranks with great romances, was enormously encouraged. "Until last Spring," he confided to his column, which is a kind of diary of heart-throbs and rebuffs, "General Eisenhower was on the way to being as unsuccessful a President as was General Grant." But now the eternal lover in Lippmann saw everything rosy again. The real Ike had once more emerged.

Well, now came the turn of the press. Reporters are noticeably careful about throwing barbed questions at Ike: he is too nice to nag and besides, he doesn't read the papers anyway and you have to explain everything. Perhaps they are also aware of the sympathetic attitude of editors. As Anthony Leviero, *New York Times* Washington correspondent, wrote for the International Press Institute: "Among newspapermen much is being made of the fact that editors and publishers are being more than kind to the Eisenhower Administration in numerous instances where it has appeared to be contrary to the public interest." Cited as examples: the Administration's security risk "numbers game"; the phony unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek; the President's personal order directing the Atomic Energy Commission to write the Dixon-Yates contract.

At last week's press conference the only reporter even to hint at heckling was John Herling of the Editors (Labor) Syndicate. Trade unionists owe Herling a debt of gratitude for what he does for them. Did Ike favor Labor Secretary Mitchell's attack on the "anti-union shop laws" in certain states, he asked? The President asked uncertainly if Herling meant the "right-to-work" laws? That's what proponents called them, said Herling crisply. Ike used the "right-to-work" tag from then on. He explained that Mitchell had the right to say what he wanted but for him—he just hadn't made up his mind.

"The Secretary of Labor is your chief labor adviser, isn't he?" demanded Herling. Listen, said Ike, mildly stirred (as though a colonel had taken liberties at a staff conference), it's the President (he emphasized the word) who makes final decisions.

After that the questions were mostly about the 1955 legislative term, though there was the brief disclosure that Ike and the Air Force put no stock in flying saucers. The replies to the press and the conferences with Congressional leaders, indicate pretty clearly what lies ahead. The 1955 legislative model may have an added touch of chrome in it here and there (a long-range highway program, for example) but it will be the earlier '53 chassis. Interest rests primarily on the new political version of the eternal triangle, particularly when the restless Old Guard finds Ike playing footie with the Democrats.

We think we can give you a pretty good forecast of the legislative program right now: a $63 billion budget; a $4 billion deficit; Democratic help to extend reciprocal trade three years (which may highlight an uneventful session) defeat of any new try at a Bricker Amendment—again with Democratic help; continuation of present corporation and excise taxes (with Democrats switching around some other tax cuts, very likely irresponsibly); a boost in the 75-cent minimum pay law; higher federal wages a fight over mail rate increases; not much change in farm legislation; defeat of Dixon-Yates—but a probable ganging up of Ike and conservatives from both parties to decontrol natural gas prices (so we can all pay higher rates) a rousing Democratic inquiry into just how many "security risks" the GOP really fired; an attempt to broaden UMT, which will probably fail (if the Cold War doesn't get hotter); a gradual lessening of legislative hysteria: also depending on the Cold War. (Right now, for example, Agriculture Secretary Ezra Benson advocates selling butter to Russia, for which he would have been lynched a year ago.) One of the nice things in the new Congress will be the presence of Dick Neuberger and a couple of other liberal newcomers; on the Republican side Clifford Case of N.J. has taken out a hunting license on old Joe McCarthy (Joe tried to defeat Case) and will make a gesture at knocking him off committees.

As for Ike's big "Asian-aid program" that seemed so promising when first reported, it is all being toned down. This is a safe and sane Administration—nothing like the Marshall Plan for it. A couple of hundred millions trimmed off European security funds will be switched to the Pacific, but nothing of an order that would disturb a Progressive Moderate. We are going to "save" Asia—cheap.

Nothing said here is intended to be pettishly trivial about Ike. In a sense we are all suitors with the wistful Walter Lippmann. Maybe the New Eisenhower will emerge. Ike has put his foot down, splendidly, against the risk of atomic war proposed by some of his advisers. And who appointed those advisers? Is it carping or ungenerous to point out that Ike did? But the Yuletide season won't permit us to push the inquiry farther. Let's rejoice over our Christmas tree as it stands.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

A Little Aid

SIGNS that some members of the Eisenhower Administration had come to realize that the West has been co-existing competitively with the Communist bloc for a long time—and that to admit it really does not constitute treason—have been popping up since late summer. Now the Administration has announced a new program of economic aid for Asia. Such a program has long been urged by the *NR*, and by a few individuals like Chester Bowles and Averell Harriman and as formal recognition that the emphasis in East-West competition is shifting from the military to the economic the announcement is encouraging. But as things stand now there is very little chance that the new Asia-aid program will be adequate. Congress is reluctant to spend much more on foreign aid; it will have to be convinced. And the Administration as usual is split. What President Eisenhower has done so far to overcome that split indicates that this program like so many others in the past may be whittled down to splinter-size before it ever reaches Congress.

Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Operations Administrator Stassen want a program limited only by what the underdeveloped nations can effectively use. Staff studies by both departments as well as an exhaustive research job by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology indicate that to compete effectively in the underdeveloped areas with Communism, the Western nations should earmark $2 billion a year for co-ordinated economic development throughout the world: the bulk to come from the US, and to be spent in Asia. This plan calls for joint use of private and public funds: business investment, government bonds and government grants.

But Treasury Secretary Humphrey adamantly opposes such a plan. He wants the US budget balanced. Foreign economic development, he believes, should depend on private investment backed up by the smallest possible number of Export-Import and International Bank loans. This is the position he held to at the Rio de Janeiro Conference of American States (*NR*, Dec. 13) and this is the position he has maintained toward the new Asia-aid policy since his return.

Humphrey is strong in this Administration. If he needed any reinforcement for his views, he got it when President Eisenhower appointed Joseph Dodge to set up and head a Foreign Aid Council and to mediate the Humphrey-Dulles dispute.

As Eisenhower's first Budget Bureau Director, Dodge, together with Humphrey introduced the "hard-money" policy which finally had to be reversed in the face of falling production and rising unemployment. Like Humphrey, Dodge is a banker whose dedication to the concept of a balanced budget is greater than his appreciation of the immensity of our task in Asia. As an administrator, he will do much to minimize waste and red tape in our foreign-aid program; as a policy-maker, he will fight to keep that program from expanding.

In Congress, it is the Democrats who will decide the kind of economic program with which we will challenge Communism. Democrats, both on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in the Senate itself, will follow the lead of Walter F. George of Georgia, who will again be Chairman during the coming session. Without George's backing, Eisenhower cannot have the Democratic support he will need to overcome Republican opposition to foreign economic aid. But George will demand a very specific program, and one which will satisfy his three main fears (1) that Asia is a bottomless pit into which all the wealth of this nation could be poured with little effect, (2) that many Asian nations cannot properly administer substantial aid funds, (3) that the new program may be primarily a scheme by which Harold Stassen and the FOA bureaucracy hopes to keep their jobs beyond the agency's July 30, 1955, cut-off date.

So the kind of program Humphrey wants is the kind of program George will look upon kindly. And if a George-Humphrey alliance is allowed to harden, there will be no chance of getting Congressional support for a program which could put the Communists on the defensive in Asia. Given Eisenhower's full support, Dulles might be able to convince George that a new approach to Asia is required or, if that fails, of lining up enough national and Senatorial support to force a compromise.

The political situation in Asia, the degree of Communist economic penetration, the conditions of East-West competition there, all will be examined in a forthcoming issue of the *New Republic*. In general, the problem is this: Communist China is gaining more rapidly as an industrial state than any other

Dear, I still think we should have had this cleared with the Department

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country in the area, including Japan and India.

"No matter what I want or what I do," said Indian Prime Minister Nehru, "in the end my people will decide the government they want by comparing with progress elsewhere. If democratic progress is slower than Communist progress they will choose Communism."

Fear of the H-Bomb

WE HAVE pointed out in some detail (*NR*, November 8) that the H-Bomb is a two-stage weapon—killing through blast and through the gradual fall-out of radioactive debris—and that any accurate estimate of its real killing power must include both effects. Now the American press is beginning to take some notice of the implications of fall-out and there seems to be a possibility that the Atomic Energy Commission will provide Civil Defense authorities and the public with at least some information on the subject. But this long official silence, broken only by the insistence of AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss that there is no such thing, has already had its effect. With nothing but patently false statements emanating from this country, speculation as to the true nature and effects of the new weapon has been encouraged everywhere. And any serious expression of concern, however theoretical, by whatever scientist in whatever country, has been eagerly listened to by people increasingly fearful. Now, as the US Government braces itself to say something about fall-out, speculation and fear have moved along to center on the long-range effects of H-Bomb explosions upon man as a species and upon his environment. As a result there is an ever-louder demand, from Europe and from Asia, for a ban on H-Bomb tests.

This is not the work of quacks. Nor is it the product of some devilish plot hatched in the Kremlin—though the Communists certainly will turn it to their advantage. The latest warning comes from the brilliant French physicist, Louis de Broglie, Nobel Prize winner, and his colleague, Charles-Noël Martin.

Their warning follows the general line taken by a number of scientists in this country and England: H-Bomb explosions have a cumulative effect upon the atmosphere which in time can render it in a sense poisonous to human beings. But the two French scientists have added a new element of precision, spelling out chemical, climatic, radioactive and genetic effects which they say are irreversible and could be set in motion by as few as 10 explosions— there have been 10 already.

The truth is that very little is known about, for example, the effect of radiation on human genetics. Much in this latest warning is highly speculative. But this has not prevented the French and European press from seizing upon it as further evidence that H-Bomb tests must be stopped immediately as a crime against humanity. Our government may regret or even fear this trend in world opinion, but only a lot of sensible talk full of facts will have any effect upon it.

What are the cumulative effects of H-Bomb explosions upon men and the environment they live in? No one yet knows. But some of our most distinguished scientists are now involved in trying to find out. The *NR* soon will present the best opinions available and open the question "should H-Bomb tests continue?" to rational, informed discussion. In the meantime, the question for the Administration is whether to meet the fears of people throughout the world with silence or with fact and reason.

Kabul and Helsinki

TWO SMALL countries, one Asian and "underdeveloped," one European and "modern," both on the borders of Russia, provide clues to the kind of tactics the West will have to match as we enter a period of intensive economic competition with the Communist bloc. Rarely discussed developments in Afghanistan and Finland, though less dramatic than Russian offers of steel-mills to India and Chinese bids for trade with Japan, reveal the everyday methods of Russian economic infiltration.

The US has not ignored Afghanistan; according to the State Department an average of $1.5 million a year has gone into that country during the past three years. American engineers and technicians, working with Export-Import Bank funds, have helped the local government complete two irrigation projects and currently are working on a flood control program.

Russia has taken a slightly different approach. In the capital city of Kabul, for example, the people see daily a lot of big and brightly identified Russian machines manned by Russian technicians —Russia has the contract to pave Kabul's streets. Russia also is financing, on a loan basis (and Russians are building) a number of capital projects in or near population centers—grain and gasoline storage facilities, bakeries, a flour mill. Czechoslovakia is providing a cement plant, a leather-processing factory and a textile factory. Repayment is to be by barter goods—thus establishing lines of trade which could become permanent.

Finland has frustrated Russian efforts to take her over through war, political subversion and reparations. The last did, however, give Russia a means of commercial penetration into its neighbor—that penetration is getting deeper all the time.

Before World War II, Finland had

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almost no trade relations with Russia; now she depends on the Soviet bloc for 30 percent of her foreign trade: much of her coal and non-ferrous metals as well as an increasing amount of industrial materials. Russia today supplies 90 percent of Finland's petroleum needs, and a new trade agreement will raise that figure to 98 percent by 1960. The same agreement will significantly boost the 30 percent over-all trade figure.

Since Russian reparation demands were especially severe in metal wares, which Finland did not ordinarily export, the expansion of Finnish industry required to meet these demands left Finland dependent upon Russia as both a customer and a source of raw materials. Now the only alternative to trade with Russia is a shut-down which would cause unemployment and thus play into the hands of the Communists. Of course, any time she chooses, Russia can try to bring about this condition by halting purchases of Finnish goods. And the Russian grip on Finland's economy increases as private firms in Finland expand to increase their sales in Russia and the government accepts Russian loans (two this year).

London Dispatch The Defense Tangle

The combination of cold war commitments with the need to maintain atomic deterrents against a hot war has severely overloaded the defense machinery of the Western world. And in addition to this overstrain, defense planning is crippled by the inability of governments to decide how atomic weapons will affect strategy and diplomacy in the next few years. Britain is just beginning to realize the nature of her problems in this field.



Ever since the defeat of Japan the West has regarded its atomic armory as the Great Deterrent against world war. Now that Russia too is thought to have a growing stock of atomic weapons, many observers foresee an atomic stalemate in which coexistence will be the only alternative to no existence, whatever doctrinaires on either side may think. For so long as the opponents in a possible war have whole continents at their disposal, even the most devastating atomic blitzkrieg could not be sure of destroying the enemy's power to retaliate in kind. And, while even now adequate air defense against jet bombers would be prohibitively expensive, defense against the inter-continental guided missiles which will soon be available will be impossible. But if the use of such weapons is likely to be suicidal, a Great Deterrent's efficacy will depend on a battle of nerves in which a democracy is always at a disadvantage. From this point of view, atomic weapons may no longer represent a net advantage to the Western camp.

On the other hand, the West cannot possibly match the Communist camp man for man. In a war of flesh the Communists hold all the cards. Thus, ever since NATO was formed its strategy has been based, not on producing equivalent manpower in Europe to the Soviet bloc, but producing sufficient manpower to compel such concentration of forces on the Soviet side as will provide vulnerable targets for atomic weapons.

The implicit contradictions between the tactical and strategic implications of atomic weapons emerged very clearly from Montgomery's recent speech. In almost the same breath he announced that NATO commanders intended to use atomic weapons from the outset of any future European war, and that it was suicidal to use atomic weapons unless one had adequate civil defense which no European country now possesses. There is much talk now of trying to reach an international convention in which atomic weapons are graded as tactical, strategic, thermonuclear and so on. But since any attempt to discriminate like this is bound to benefit one side more than the other, it is difficult to believe that there is a way of escape along these lines.

At present the West seems to have settled on the assumption that atomic weapons are still the main deterrent against world war, but that conventional weapons are the main deterrent against local aggression, as in Korea. But everywhere Finance Ministers are protesting that the cost of maintaining both deterrents at once is intolerable, particularly since in both fields the rate of increase in both price and obsolescence is rising rapidly.

Britain, for example, now faces a defense crisis on policy, production, and manpower.

Harold MacMillan, the Defense Minister, has just announced that Anti-Aircraft Command will be abolished, and that only a small number of anti-aircraft guns will be retained to defend certain vital targets against low-flying aircraft. Yet, so far as is known, Britain does not yet possess anti-aircraft guided missiles in anything like the number required for even minimal defense. The Navy is being allowed to run down, and Britain is concentrating all her efforts on the Air Force and Army. But the Army faces a serious manpower problem. Though Britain still keeps a two-year period of universal national service, 80 percent of her soldiers are serving abroad, and there is no strategic reserve at home. Political circumstances now permit the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, Trieste and Korea, but the gains here are wiped out by the expected loss of 35,000 men in the next two years through a fall in regular recruiting and a decline in the number of conscripts.

Worse still, the proportion of trained men in the army is falling steadily because regular service involves exceptional hardship. One battalion has had 19 different stations since 1945 and two others have had only two months in England since the end of the war. And in many overseas stations accommodation and conditions are a serious deterrent to service.

There is no magic solution to these problems. They only serve to underline that, given the appalling cost of modern weapons and the bitter hostility of the Communist world, no Western country can afford independence in defense. The only real relief must come through realizing the original NATO concept of balanced international forces rather than self-sufficient national forces. Parallel with such integration in the technical field must come a more equitable sharing of the financial and military burdens of containing Communism all over the world. Britain has already begun prodding her Commonwealth partners to play a larger part in the defense of Southeast Asia. But here again the vital need is to restore to NATO as a politico-military organization the impetus and idealism which inspired its founders five years ago.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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Paris Dispatch MOSCOW'S NEW WARNING

The Kremlin's latest note to France suggests some disquieting changes in Soviet methods and policies. It wasn't the first—nor perhaps will it be the last—warning that the Franco-Soviet treaty of 1944 would be annulled if the French National Assembly ratified Western European Union. But this most recent note, delivered the day when Pierre Mendès-France was beginning talks with Secretary Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden was the first formal, official threat that the treaty might be "crossed out." As such it was a departure from Soviet practice. In the past, as the *London Times* points out, "The Soviet way, particularly under Stalin, has generally been to leave loose ends, to rely upon implicit threats and suggested consequences, rather than to depend upon dramatic changes of policy or diplomatic severances."

The formal warning was unusual in another respect. None comparable to it was delivered when the French were considering the European Defense Community. Nor, on the eve of debate in the House of Commons on WEU, was there any threat that ratification would cause the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 to be annulled, though it is almost identical with the Franco-Soviet treaty. As a matter of fact, the Russians suggested to General Charles de Gaulle at the time of his visit to Moscow a three-power pact, and only his refusal prevented the combination. Later, the Russians made no move to bring into question the Anglo-Soviet mutual guarantee against any return of German militarism, neither when the British in 1950 came out in favor of German rearmament, nor when parliament ratified WEU.



Some questions arise therefore. Is Moscow really trying to break France away from the Atlantic Alliance, and working on the assumption that she can be treated not only as the weakest link in the alliance but also as an inferior nation, if not as a satellite? If the answer is affirmative the only possible comment—here in Paris on the eve of the debate on WEU in the Assembly—is that the Russians should have known better.

The Soviet move was badly conceived and badly timed. Before it was made, ratification was likely. Now, approval is almost certain—partly despite and partly, or even mostly, because of the note. The Kremlin should have learned long ago from the experience of the State Department that threats don't win votes in the Palais Bourbon.

As an effort to scare Mendès-France the warning was bound to fail. He doesn't scare easily. On the contrary, he thrives politically—and in the esteem of the people—on living dangerously. Before the Russian threat was made, he had stood his ground on WEU against hell and high water, that is, against Charles de Gaulle's demand for a rider postponing the actual start of German rearmament until a "last chance" four-power parley with the Russians, and against Konrad Adenauer's bid for a "re-interpretation" of the Saar agreement.

If the Premier's promise of a truly independent foreign policy was brought into some question by his remarkable success in the US, the doubts about him were removed by his taking the initiative in feeling out Moscow about the Austrian treaty. The Kremlin's rebuff balanced GOP Washington's acclaim. And if the Paris agreements have been losing popularity in the French parliament—as was shown by the vote in the foreign affairs committee and the national defense committee of the Assembly—it was certainly won back after Moscow's threat to treat France as Britain wasn't treated on a similar issue.

Even the neutralist newspapers recognize that Moscow made a *gaffe* in the best German tradition. *Combat* says that it was a mistake to think that the eve of the debate in the Assembly was the right time to send the note. The *Monde* comments that, "So brutal a step runs the serious risk of stiffening French opinion and of creating difficulties even for the most convinced opponents of German rearmament, who can more easily be denounced once again for apparent submission to Moscow's *diktat*."

As a psychological warfare stunt to impress French public opinion, the strong-arm tactic was worse than a failure. German rearmament is accepted with the greatest reluctance but it *is* generally accepted by now because every single Russian effort to prevent it has been wholly negative. The people have no illusions left about the 1944 Franco-Soviet pact as a guarantee of security against the Germans or anyone else on the eve of 1955.

It is true, on the other hand, that French political thinking continues to be influenced by the tradition of Franco-Russian friendship. The desire for the "last chance" conference some time before German rearmament is fully put into effect is still strong.

Nevertheless, thanks to the Russians, Mendès-France undoubtedly was expressing the opinion of most Frenchmen when he told the NATO Council of Ministers that the Russian note would merely strengthen the determination of parliament to approve the Paris agreements.

But this is true only if Moscow's real purpose is really to break France away from the Atlantic Alliance. There is another theory, here in Paris, about the Soviet intention. The Kremlin may be preparing for the future. In that future, the breaking of the Franco-Soviet pact of 1944 would leave Moscow full of diplomatic freedom in dealing with *both* Germanys. Under such circumstances, the chances to win over the large—and growing—number of West Germans who give top priority to reunification, as against rearmament, would be increased.

By this theory, therefore, the real purpose of the change in Moscow's methods and policy is to prepare for an all-out effort to break Germany—first, West German, then Great Germany—away from the West. The annullment of the Franco-Soviet treaty may be a first step on a new course. The Kremlin may go on to the denunciation of the Potsdam agreements. But Potsdam confirmed Yalta, and this would mean a serious blow to the legal status of all of Eastern Europe, especially the Oder-Neisse line. Could Germany resist the temptation to turn East, however, if it was Moscow which offered to make the change in that line?

Paris FRANK GORRELL

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New Light on the LATTIMORE CASE

by Brian Gilbert

1941	Owen Lattimore resigned as editor of *Pacific Affairs*
1941-42	Lattimore served as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek
1942-44	Lattimore served with Office of War Information
1944	Alfred Kohlberg accuses Lattimore of being a Soviet apologist
March 1950	Senator McCarthy accuses Lattimore of being top Soviet agent in US
Spring 1950	Tydings Committee calls McCarthy charge "fraud and hoax"
February 1952	McCarran Committee hears Lattimore deny Communist affiliations
May 1952	Judge McGranery interrogated by McCarran Committee
August 1952	Roy Cohn joins Justice Department
December 1952	Lattimore indicted for perjury for testimony before McCarran Committee
Winter 1952	Roy Cohn leaves Justice Department
May 1953	Judge Youngdahl dismisses core of first indictment
July 1954	Judge Youngdahl's dismissal of core count sustained by Court of Appeals
October 1954	Lattimore indicted on two new counts
November 1954	Prosecution asks Youngdahl to disqualify himself as biased
December 1954	Youngdahl hears argument on motion to dismiss second indictment

TOWARD the end, they say, Pat McCarran lost his enthusiasm for Roy Cohn, but by then the damage had been done. Perhaps, had he lived a little longer, McCarran might have talked a little more freely about what he and Cohn decided that summer, and we would now understand better how the Lattimore case began. But we do know enough today to come much closer to the truth than we could six months ago.

During the year before he met Cohn in the summer of 1952, McCarran reached the peak of his power. As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he could decide whether any ambitious lawyer would cap his career by becoming a Federal Judge or a high Justice Department official. As head of the Subcommittee on Internal Security, he could direct the entire impact of a Congressional investigation wisely to inform the public of the danger of subversion; or, for the meanest of motives, discredit any individual or organization.

From the summer of 1951 into the following winter, McCarran's Subcommittee heard a battalion of witnesses testifying about the Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore. Their stories, fitted together, created this picture: the IPR was no longer a YMCA-sponsored clearing house for objective, scholarly information about the Far Pacific area; it had come under the influence of Communists, and its chief publication, *Pacific Affairs*, edited by Lattimore, had become a vehicle for Stalinoid propaganda, craftily rewritten to avoid Marxist clichés, which subtly infected the thinking of those who determined the State Department's Far Eastern policy. Committee members Jenner and Ferguson had made many little speeches, completing the thesis: American policy might have prevented the fall of China, they said, but because the IPR had done its work so well, that policy was the product of infected thinking, and China had fallen. Therefore Owen Lattimore could be charged with a major responsibility for a tragedy affecting the lives of a billion people.

The thesis was not new; it had first been expounded by Alfred Kohlberg as early as 1944. It had been restated in a *Reader's Digest* article by Max Eastman and

Brian Gilbert is the pen name of a well-known Washington commentator on political affairs.

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McCARRAN
He needed a man



COHN
The man McCarran found

McGRANERY
He wasn't against it



BUDENZ
They helped him remember

J. B. Powell in 1945 (Lattimore was described as the "leading Soviet apologist in the United States"). In the late '40's smoke rising from a dispute between Lattimore and his opponents within the IPR had caught the eye of the FBI and resulted in an investigation of charges against Lattimore; the Justice Department concluded that there was no basis for an espionage prosecution against him. Then Senator McCarthy repeated Kohlberg's allegation in a Senate speech in 1950, and touched off the Tydings Committee's investigation of Lattimore and the IPR, which concluded that the whole thesis was "a fraud and a hoax." The Justice Department, retaining its interest in the matter, reviewed Lattimore's testimony before the Tydings group (in which he defended the IPR and denied any personal Communist affiliation or sympathy) and concluded that it would not merit a prosecution for perjury.

WHEN McCarran brought his Committee into the controversy, he was already convinced that Kohlberg's thesis was good, and he was out to prove it. Accusing witnesses were encouraged to plumb deep into their memories, knowing that any recollection would be rewarded and, there being no cross-examination, that inaccuracy would bring no retribution. If they contradicted earlier statements made to the Tydings Committee, these small lapses would be overlooked. Take, for example, the testimony of witness Louis Budenz: While he never claimed any personal knowledge that Lattimore was working with the Communists, he told the McCarran Committee of five or six occasions on which, he said, other persons indicated to him such a connection. But these appeared to be new memories—Budenz never reported Lattimore to the FBI; he did not include Lattimore among the many he denounced in a 1949 *Collier's* article for sabotaging our China policy; the manuscript of Budenz' book on the China situation carried no mention of Lattimore though "a passing mention" was inserted after Senator McCarthy attacked Lattimore in May, 1950; before the Tydings Committee Budenz swore that he had "never seen any vestige of his [Lattimore's] Communist Party membership"; and when Budenz conferred with an editor about his *Collier's* piece, he said that he was not saying Lattimore "acted as a Communist agent in any way."

When the Tydings Committee tried to force Budenz to enumerate his personal knowledge of Lattimore's activities, his answers were so vague they led Sen. Theodore Green (D, R.I.) to this conclusion:

> Then, you say you have never seen him, never talked with him, never had any communication with him. You have read none of his books to speak of, none of his articles to speak of.

Then, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge (R, Mass.), trying to pin him down, asked for "a specific instance when an order or an instruction was given [to Lattimore] and carried out." Finally, Budenz replied: "Well, the order to represent the Chinese Communists as 'agrarian reformers' was certainly carried out." Lodge: "Is that the most concrete and specific illustration there is?" Budenz: "That is the most concrete there is, yes sir."

It was not quite concrete enough, for despite many friendly references to the Chinese Communists, Lattimore's writings have never revealed a single instance when he called them "agrarian reformers," and he always made it fairly clear that they had close connections with the Soviet Union.

It is important to note that when Lattimore finally had a chance to testify, he categorically denied Budenz' charges. Senator Ferguson commented that one or the other was lying. Lattimore demanded that the conflicts between his testimony and Budenz' be referred to the Justice Department and examined for possible perjury, and Senator Watkins (doing his first duty as a Senator-investigator) said of Lattimore's demand: "I think it is proper. It should be referred, of course." But Budenz' testimony was never referred to Justice; instead it served as the framework for McCarran's final report.

Lattimore came to the witness stand indignant and truculent. He had been defending himself for a decade, and he thought that the Tydings Committee had cleared his name. But over a seven-month period McCarran had brought before the public a procession of witnesses

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

MURRAY
He spoke for the law



ROVER
He carries the ball

YOUNGDAHL
He must decide

LATTIMORE
?

whose testimony accumulated to ruin Lattimore's reputation. Whether or not he was innocent of their charges, he was angry. Before he entered the hearing room, but after consulting his attorney, he issued to the press a vigorous statement against the committee. McCarran was waiting; before Lattimore gave a word of testimony, the Chairman made his counterattack, demonstrating that his mind was not just closed, it was hermetically sealed:

> Every Communist in America has taken opportunity to cast invective and discouraging and disparaging remarks with reference to this committee and its membership. . . . It is not at all out of line with the general procedure of the Communist Party and Communists generally in the world. . . . A statement has been filed today by the witness. . . . In that statement there is carried out the same policy as has been carried out against this Committee.

From that moment the matter was decided. Lattimore was unco-operative, sarcastic, convinced that he was being lynched. McCarran was a prosecutor. Angered by Lattimore's bearing, other Committee members joined the attack.

For 12 days, relays of questioners sought to trap the witness, to force him back into contradictions or inconsistencies which could later be used for a perjury indictment. And the Committee had ammunition: a barnfull of minutes, memoranda and correspondence taken without a subpoena from an official of the IPR, many of which referred to Lattimore's work on *Pacific Affairs*. With these at hand, the Committee knew far more about day-to-day IPR activity than Lattimore had ever known or could possibly dredge out of his memory. So they went to work, leading Lattimore through the fog of recollection. Small events, 10 or more years before, were touched by a focused question, and any indication that Lattimore recalled it vaguely drew a dozen more inquiries. If he erred or slipped or tripped or put an occasion a day out of proper sequence, they had him.

When they were done, they thought they had caught him out enough times to recommend prosecution for perjury. They went on to publish a report on the IPR which called Lattimore a "conscious and articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy."

Six of Lattimore's statements, in which the Committee thought it had tripped him, later became the six "minor counts" of the First Indictment. Lattimore was alleged to have lied when he said:

1. He had not known prior to 1950 that one "Chi" was a Communist.
2. He had not known in the late '30s that one "Asiaticus" was a Communist.
3. He had not knowingly published articles by Communists in *Pacific Affairs*.
4. The date of a luncheon with the Russian Ambassador was after [not before] the German invasion of Russia.
5. He had not taken care of all the mail of Lauchlin Currie.
6. He had not made arrangements with Communist authorities before a trip to Yenan [this count was dismissed by the District Court as self-contradictory, the decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals, and has not been renewed].

WHAT use, from a legal and constitutional point of view, did Pat McCarran make of his investigating subcommittee? The pattern he followed was succinctly described in testimony before the Tydings Committee by a man who understood it thoroughly. Said Senator McCarthy:

> It is hard to get them for their criminal activities in connection with espionage, but a way has been found. We are getting them for perjury and putting some of the worst of them away. For that reason I hope every witness who comes here is put under oath and his testimony is gone over with a fine tooth comb, and if we cannot convict some of them for their disloyal activities, perhaps we can convict some of them for perjury.

Thus the Congressional investigation, traditionally limited to seeking facts on which to base legislation and checking the performance by the executive of duties imposed by statute, is made to function very much like a Grand Jury. First the Chairman has a hunch; at some stage in the proceeding, perhaps even before the hearings

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"First the Chairman has a hunch . . . the Committee then

are begun, he finds the defendant guilty. The Committee then obtains a public "conviction" by purposeful publicity. And for such a prosecuting committee, perjury becomes an objective.

Perjury is deliberate lying under oath. It is punished because the fear of punishment forces witnesses to give facts to investigators; upon these facts legislation can be drafted with an accurate appraisal of need. But the prosecuting committee seeks not facts, but perjury, not truth, but falsehood. And after the investment of time and money and emotion, the prosecutors are politically committed; if their work is to succeed, they cannot rest until a legal prosecution results.

As soon as the Committee's recommendation reached the Justice Department, Pat McCarran moved into a new phase of his program. Constantly he telephoned the Department of Justice, demanding prosecution of Lattimore. And his demands were persuasive; he was after all chairman of the Judiciary Committee. As we shall see, he attempted to make appointment of an Attorney General conditional on agreement to prosecute Lattimore, and he succeeded in putting to work on the case a man who had no loyalty to the Department, only to McCarran and his own ambition. McCarran thus had friends within the Department who sent him all briefs submitted by the prosecution, informed him of the course of intra-departmental discussions.

And he found little resistance when he pressured the new Attorney General, James P. McGranery (who had been a politician and was a judge . . . when his stint was over, he might want to be a judge again). McGranery knew that the Lattimore case was a hot political issue, that the Republicans were accusing the Department of being slow to prosecute Communists, that as a good Democrat it was part of his job to refute that accusation, and that his appointment by Mr. Truman was just a handsome scroll without McCarran's approval.

When McGranery appeared before the Committee, McCarran made it obvious that no one hesitant about prosecuting Lattimore would be approved. McCarran asked:

> If it should be related . . . that you were opposed to presenting the matter of Owen Lattimore to a Grand Jury, would there be any truth in it?

And McGranery replied, "There would not be, sir."

But the guarantee was apparently insufficient for McCarran, for although he approved McGranery's appointment, he worked hard for months to find a man who would serve as his personal agent within the Justice Department, or at any rate a man who was not harnessed by any exaggerated sense of loyalty to his superiors. He found such a man: Roy Cohn.

Cohn, very early in his career, had found a berth in the United States Attorney's office in New York, and he soon was put to work on a case which involved allegedly subversive employees of the United Nations. Cohn had insufficient evidence to get an indictment, so he proposed instead that the Grand Jury hand down a "report," making broad charges against a number of individuals, and revealing, by quotation, testimony and statements of refusals to answer. This proposal was unusual, since testimony before a Grand Jury is secret. It amounted to using a Grand Jury investigation as a sounding-board for charges for which there was not sufficient evidence even to justify an indictment, much less a conviction.

When the House of Representatives investigated the matter, they were told by Cohn's superiors that they regarded his action as "reckless, improper and self-defeating." The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Mr. Charles Murray (now President of the District of Columbia Bar Association) testified that he reprimanded Cohn . . . but that Cohn was undeterred.

Later, arguing that the Grand Jury could properly issue the report, Cohn told a judge that he was prepared to argue against the position taken by the Department, by his superiors. For this action, Cohn was censured for disobedience by Assistant Attorney General Ross Malone, but censure left him undaunted. He convinced the Grand Jury to issue its report. Myles Lane, United States Attorney in New York and Cohn's immediate superior, wanted to fire him. Lane was supported by Murray and Malone, but Mr. McGranery was now Attorney General, and he was listening to other voices. Instead of firing Cohn, he asked him to come down to Washington, after a little vacation in Europe, and give the Department the benefit of his wisdom.

Cohn went to Europe, but he soon was writing the Department that he was "bored"; he asked for some files on alleged subversives sent over to keep his mind occupied.

Again Murray protested to McGranery. Again McGranery gave a soft answer: Cohn would get no files until he got back, but would he be interested in making some recommendations on the Lattimore case? Cohn returned, read the files and gave his answer. Within the Department there was much discussion as to the propriety and form of an indictment, but McGranery always deferred to Cohn, and finally asked him to draft the First Indictment.

As soon as Cohn came to Washington, he began to

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obtains a public 'conviction'. . . perjury becomes an objective"

work closely with McCarran. Cohn reported to McCarran rather than to his superiors in the Department, and when disputes occurred among the government lawyers Cohn relayed his side and the name of his opponent to McCarran. This relationship was maintained while the indictment was drawn up and presented to the Grand Jury.

THE first count of the First Indictment, and the first and second counts of the Second Indictment, attributed to Lattimore the intent to lie when he read to the McCarran Committee the following statement, which he had prepared in advance with the approval of his attorney:

> All kinds of attempts have been made to depict me as a Communist or a Soviet agent. I have in fact been falsely identified as a fellow-traveler, sympathizer or follower of the Communist line or promoter of Communist interests. Now I want to make my position clear. I am not interested in fine or technical distinctions. I am not interested in gradations or degrees of disloyalty. I have no use for fancy, legalistic distinctions. I am none of these things and never have been. I am not and have never been a Communist, a Soviet agent, sympathizer or any other kind of promoter of Communism or Communist interests, and all of these nonsenses. I so testified long ago, under oath before the Tydings Subcommittee, and I do so again.

Both sides seem agreed that if he had never made this statement, he probably would never have been indicted for perjury. The six "minor counts" we have discussed are all "material" only when viewed against the backdrop of these blanket denials.

It is vital to note that the prosecution does not allege that all Lattimore's denials were false; he has never been charged with lying when he denied either McCarthy's original allegation that he was a Communist "agent" or the eventual conclusion of the McCarran Committee that he was a "conscious and articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy."

It is also worth noting that Lattimore is not accused of lying when he denied being a Communist, nor is this a prosecution for espionage, sabotage, passing documents or *any other overt act of disloyalty.*

In the first count of the First Indictment, the government charged him with lying when he said that he was not a "sympathizer or promoter of Communist interests." Even those who hold that Lattimore meant to lie in his statement regard this charge as weak.

Its weakness was perceived by the defense lawyers who moved that it be dismissed, and their motion was sustained by Judge Luther Youngdahl, who struck the first count out of the indictment on the grounds that it was:

> . . . so nebulous and indefinite that a jury would have to indulge in speculation in order to arrive at a verdict. Sympathies and beliefs and what they mean to different individuals involve concepts that are highly nebulous and speculative at best. I presume a person could sympathize with a belief and yet still not believe. To probe the mind in a situation like this would give rise to nothing more than sheer speculation on the part of the prober. It is fundamental that a jury should not be asked to determine an issue which can be decided only on conjecture.

Youngdahl's view was sustained by an 8-1 vote of the Court of Appeals. With the core of its case gone, the Department had to decide whether to drop the case or to seek a new indictment which could meet his objections. The decision to bring a second indictment against Lattimore was reached, as is customary, by consultation between the United States Attorney in charge of the case, Mr. Leo Rover, and the then newly-appointed Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins. Tompkins arrived on the scene just in time to be handed the file, among a hundred others, and to be asked whether or not he would approve filing another indictment, again based on Lattimore's general denial. According to Department practice, Tompkins was advised of possible alternatives in a long memorandum from Mr. Rover. Without passing on the merits of their decision to continue the prosecution, it is important to stress that it was based upon different criteria than the intial decision to seek an indictment; there were still outstanding five of the "minor counts" (which had either been left standing by Judge Youngdahl or restored by the Court of Appeals) and a prosecutor's mind operates quite differently when he is asked the best way to continue a case already underway than when he is asked to decide whether or not to undertake a prosecution. Rover and Tompkins were not sitting as judges. As prosecutors they believed their responsibility extended only to presenting the case in the best possible light, and then abiding by the final decision of the court.

ONE THING should be thoroughly understood: the government lawyers who have been working on this case are convinced that Lattimore meant to lie when he made his general denial; they believe that he consciously had worked closely with the Communists (if he was no Communist himself); that when he denied it, he lied. This, for them, ended the matter.

Here is the crux of the perjury charge: what did Owen Lattimore "mean"? A statement may be false, and still

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not be perjury. The speaker must know it is false when he makes it. Again, what did Owen Lattimore mean? Are the words he spoke susceptible of precise definition? Could a jury conclude from factual evidence whether Lattimore meant to use them falsely?

WHEN Mr. Rover presented to a new Grand Jury his draft for a new indictment, he sought to select terms from Lattimore's statement which he could prove to be false, and which were sufficiently definite to clear the hurdle which had caught the first indictment. He obtained an indictment on two new counts:

1. That Lattimore lied when he denied being "a follower of the Communist line,"
2. That he lied when he denied being a "promoter of Communism or of Communist interests."

If there were evidence that Lattimore actually received and carried out orders from the Cominform, the case would be relatively simple. But the witnesses before the McCarran Committee offered no such proof. It is possible that such proof exists. But reviewing the history of this prosecution, we can conclude that such a direct and intimate correlation between Lattimore's views and the desires of the Cominform would come as a great surprise to those who have insisted most that he be prosecuted.

The fact that the indictment does not attack Lattimore's specific denials leads to the conclusion that the prosecution hopes only to prove a less definite charge, to convince the jury that though Lattimore may have been no disciplined Communist, he carried on a flirtation with the party, and that he now knows perfectly well that he promoted its interest and followed its line.

Lawyers differ as to whether Lattimore's words described such a relationship. If the relationship is a vague one, Lattimore's words, and the charge based upon those words, are even less precise. And an imprecise charge is not a proper charge.

According to our legal tradition, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate upon vague charges, for it may be satisfied with proof that is equally vague. Furthermore, a vague charge does not enable the defendant to meet the prosecution squarely, and, even if he wins before one jury, he may be subjected to another prosecution based upon the same fact situation. (Double jeopardy is hard to prove unless the indictment is specific.)

For these reasons a vague indictment is not permitted to get to a jury. On a preliminary motion the judge will strike it down. For these same reasons, when a vague case is brought to a Grand Jury by the Department of Justice it is fair to think that the decision to prosecute may have been influenced by political pressure.

For the Department knows that perjury is a flexible device. The records of Congressional committees are littered with minor inaccuracies and misstatements by witnesses who are never prosecuted. Even if the Department has good reason to doubt the veracity of a witness, when he makes a specific statement of fact, it generally does not expend the time, money and talent required to prosecute unless that misstatement appears to cloak far greater evil. It does not clog the courts with petty prosecutions for perjury. Thus Alger Hiss was prosecuted for an alleged lie about dates because that lie was thought to be part of his denial of passing secret documents to a foreign power. The same relationship occurred in the William Remington case. Behind the perjury indictment of Hiss and Remington was an unwritten indictment for assisting espionage: in each case their denial of a specific fact was crucial to their denial of the unwritten indictment.

Yet in the Lattimore case the prosecution apparently found insufficient evidence to support an attack on the defendant's specific, factual statements. The indictment selected only his vaguest terms. And there was no comparable "implied" crime in the background. It is certain that McCarran had an "implied" crime in mind—but it was not the sort of "implied crime" which customarily supports a determination to prosecute for perjury. What was McCarran's case against Lattimore? What was the case his Committee sought to prove, and his influence upon the Department of Justice was employed to forward?

IT WAS a purely ideological crime: Lattimore was charged with infecting the minds of those who conducted our foreign policy in the Far East. The vigor of this charge depends upon the assumptions that we might have prevented the fall of China to the Communists, and that only because our State Department was so infected did our policy fail and China fall.

If these assumptions were valid, if Lattimore was such a titan who could effect such enormous evil, we might be very angry. But we have no laws which permit that anger to result in his prosecution. No law makes mere influence a crime.

The McCarran Committee attacked Owen Lattimore for conduct no law calls a crime. The Committee apparently feared that even if it could convince the people that Lattimore's writing had caused the fall of China, Congress could not be persuaded to pass a law making such writing a crime.

So, in 1952, McCarran pressured the Department of Justice into attempting a very unusual application of the perjury statute. He sought, and obtained, an indictment of Owen Lattimore for allegedly lying when he used vague terms; an indictment which the jury could interpret as their suspicions dictated. Directing their suspicions would be anxieties about the Communist menace and indignation over the loss of China. Those who brought this case into being knew the power of these emotions. And they thought they could predict the outcome.

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Portraits from the Valley—IV

Dear Stub . . . Signed Dwight

by Michael Straight

DEAR STUB the letter began. Sterling Cole, the elegant Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy left out the familiar greeting. The rest he read to the committee members summoned in lame duck session to rush the Dixon-Yates contract through.

The letter, signed Dwight D. Eisenhower, and dated November 10 came as a last minute reprieve for two servants of a larger cause, the chubby and expressionless Edgar Dixon, and the aged and sleepy Eugene Yates. For the Administration witnesses had failed miserably in six days of testimony to prove either the soundness of the project or the necessity for haste. Lewis Strauss was arrogant and refused to discuss the rush. Rowland Hughes was apologetic and muttered in a feeble way. Kenneth Nichols was stubborn in bearing the main burden of rationalization until he fell under its weight. The eight Democrats on the committee were justifiably angry as they listened in vain for answers to their searching questions. The 10 Republicans were understandably glum. They admitted in private that the Administration was behaving outrageously. And two of them seemed ready to join the Democrats in holding the contract for the new Congress to consider. There it would have died.

Then, for the second time, Mr. Eisenhower intervened. He set forth fake assumptions, posed fake alternatives and so reached fake conclusions. In the weakest of modern Presidential statements, he pressed approval of the contract through.

Dear Stub. . . . The core of the letter is "the very important truth" which the President would have the nation believe, the "partisans" of TVA ignore. It is that "*IF* the federal government assumes responsibility" for the valley's power (italics mine) "it has a similar responsibility with respect to every other area and region and corner of the United States of America." Thus, concludes the President, the nation cannot authorize one more steam plant for the valley unless it is ready to undertake a "gigantic power development" for the entire nation.

But there is no "if" in the signature of the United States. The federal government very plainly assumed the responsibility for the valley's power supply when it amended the TVA Act in 1939. When Mr. Eisenhower took office he swore to uphold that law, as he had done in the course of the 1952 campaign. Even if the government's ultimate purpose is to amend the law and thus to transfer responsibility, its duty is to approach TVA in the spirit of an investor guarding his property rather than as a conqueror disposing of enemy loot.

Further, the Congress was not as irresponsible as the President would now have us suppose. It created the TVA in recognition of a unique opportunity in a country whose size and diversity create widely varying needs. The President's "logic" is, of all the arguments cited to prevent progress, the most ancient and discredited. You can't regulate child labor unless you regulate all labor, the opponents of progress maintained; you can't build public housing unless you build all housing; you can't fix minimum wages without fixing all wages. The nation has progressed by rejecting this thesis which is as meaningless for citizens set apart by geography as for those distinguished by social and economic levels. The federal government is under no obligation to build a B-36 base in Connecticut because it builds one in Texas; to construct a drydock in Denver similar to its drydock in Norfolk. No one holds that because the government finances huge irrigation projects in the dry lands west of the Mississippi it must finance similar projects on Martha's Vineyard and in Maine. Because the government undertakes to develop for the nation the benefits inherent in the Tennessee and the Columbia, it does not follow "logically" that it must harness the trickle that ekes its way down Tombigbee Creek and Turkey Cock Run. In fact, to argue thus, as President Eisenhower does, is to maintain that the only durable investment of federal administration is the cookie cutter.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, however, is committed to this ludicrous view. "I believe," he wrote to Representative Cole, "that the project for building new plants at federal expense . . . is wholly indefensible unless it should become part of a vast national plan." A fine distinction may be drawn between new steam plants and new units for existing plants. For these have been recommended as part of next year's budget by General Herbert Vogel, the new Chairman of the Board of Directors of TVA. It seems more probable, however, that the President has reversed his own appointee, and barred from the budget those appropriations necessary for TVA's efficient operation. If this is true, then the worst fears of the valley residents will be confirmed. Mr. Eisenhower will have committed the power of the Presidency to an effort

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to undermine the great agency he is legally compelled and personally committed to uphold.

The Dear Stub letter admittedly maintains the fiction that the Dixon-Yates contract is good for TVA. The validity of this view is indicated in the official protest against the TVA contract signed by Harvey Curtis, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of TVA, and sent to the Bureau of the Budget on July 2:

> The most serious aspect of this whole arrangement is the lack of control which the TVA Board would have over the costs TVA would incur. The contract would be between Dixon-Yates and the Atomic Energy Commission with the administration of its terms exercised by AEC on behalf of the government. Since AEC contemplates that TVA would pay all costs, exclusive of taxes, neither AEC nor Dixon-Yates would have the normal incentives to insist on economies in construction and operation. The TVA Board is charged under the TVA Act with the responsibility for successfully carrying out the provisions of the Act including widespread distribution of power at the lowest possible rates adequate to make the power projects self-supporting and self-liquidating. We fail to see how this Board can carry out its responsibilities and be held accountable for efficient and economical performance when the crucial managerial function of cost control is assumed by another agency—an agency with no stake of its own in the efficiency or economy of the arrangements, the construction of the facilities or their operation.

Believing this, is the TVA Board compelled nonetheless to sign with the AEC, to buy Dixon-Yates power, and thus to violate the spirit if not the letter of the law? By pursuing its stubborn course, in pressing the Dixon-Yates contract while forbidding new steam plants for TVA the Eisenhower Administration is forcing in the most harsh manner a reconsideration of the powers of the President, the status of TVA as an independent agency and the rights and duties of TVA directors and staff.



Irrigating by electric pump in Arizona.

In TVA the Congress created an independent agency without precedent whose status between the executive and legislative branches has never been closely defined. The Act declares that the TVA directors shall be "appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." It makes no mention of the President's power of removal but provides that the directors "may be removed from office at any time by a concurrent resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives." The President, of course, retains the implied power of removal that derives from his constitutional authority over all the executive branch. He cannot change, but must administer the laws; within their framework, all federal officials work for him. When a TVA director, Dr. A. E. Morgan, refused to report to President Roosevelt the President in fact removed him. His grounds were contumacy and the Supreme Court declined to review the case.

CONTUMACY is not the only legitimate ground on which the President can remove the TVA directors. While they serve, the directors are responsible less to the President than to the governing law. The TVA Act requires that, "All members of the board shall be persons who profess a belief in the feasibility and wisdom of this Act." The directors are further bound to provide "conscientious performance under the statute." While they report to the President, they are not part of his political administration; their responsibility is not to follow him in his caprices and whims, but to administer the agency in accordance with the terms of the Act. The directors are legally entitled and morally obligated to refuse to enter into a contract with the Dixon-Yates syndicate or with the AEC, if they believe the contract is harmful to TVA. The President may then remove them and propose to Congress the names of men who share his interpretation of the statute; but he cannot himself sign the Dixon-Yates contract or order it signed.

For the directors then, the conflict is urgent and real. They are bound by the Act. They are further bound by existing contracts with the distributors of TVA power. The distributors are avowedly opposed to the Dixon-Yates contract and on record as preferring a dim-out of power to a surrender of the basic prerogatives of TVA. For them, and for the directors they look to for leadership, the issue is whether TVA is to continue to function as the nation's lowest cost power producer or whether the economies created by an integrated and unified system are to be dissipated without a fight.

By fighting for principle TVA has won the respect of the valley and the nation. Many times Kenneth McKellar used his key post in the Senate to tie the future of TVA to special deals for patronage, for payroll padding, for projects that were not justified on merit alone. Each time TVA was offered the choice of behind-the-scenes compromise or a ripper bill that threatened its whole existence. By standing fast the directors made TVA what it is today.

Now the directors and the staff of TVA, their distributors, consumers and supporters face the largest and hardest of tests. General Vogel may snap to at the President's commands. But Harvey Curtis and Raymond Paty form the majority of the Board. They cannot believe that their

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objections to the Dixon-Yates plant voiced in the July 2 letter have been met by subsequent revisions in the contract. They must fight where they can. But where is the battle to start and stop? On one battlefield or another the present attack on TVA may be beaten back. But even if the contract is defeated, the freeze on TVA may continue while Mr. Eisenhower remains in the White House. The obligation presses upon TVA supporters to search for a new way of financing future needs.

One method is by the construction of municipal steam plants integrated in the TVA system. Memphis, on its way to becoming one of the 10 largest cities of the nation, is determined to build a steam plant rather than place its future in the hands of Dixon-Yates. Nashville, Knoxville and Chattanooga could follow suit. There the expansion would stop. The waste in reserve capacity would be considerable and yet the needs of smaller communities and rural areas would not be met.

A second method is for the seven states of the region to take over from the federal government responsibility for TVA. In the last resort the seven states will act to save the system. But the difficulties in an interstate authority would be immense. Sixty percent of TVA power is used by one state—Tennessee. In the remaining six, TVA is in a minority as a power supplier and private utilities still dominate the state legislatures. The simplest of interstate agencies, such as the Port of New York Authority have had a far from happy history. "The truth is," said one expert to me in Knoxville, "if there was no federal government in existence we would have to create one to manage this system."

A third method, much discussed in the valley, is for the TVA to finance its expansion by issuing bonds. For months bond brokers have been canvassing the region. A successful precedent exists in Ontario for a bond-financed authority. Ontario Hydro is owned by the municipalities and rural districts of the province. It sells them power at cost, and its record of rates and electricity used is unsurpassed. It finds an eager market for the $200 million it offers each year in low interest bonds. By these means Ontario Hydro has financed an expansion of capacity by 84 percent since 1945. It is now two-thirds the size of TVA. If the TVA board could be given its open end authority to issue bonds then this might point to a solution. However, Ontario Hydro started from scratch. Congress as sole investor in TVA is unlikely to surrender the control of new bond issues, and this control manipulated by the utility lobby, could be as crippling for TVA as the present method of annual appropriations. New York banks and holding companies took from the Tennessee Valley the control of its power supply. Congress in turn took that control from the discredited utility empires and held it in TVA. Given the right climate, a restoration of control to the valley would logically complete the circle. But in the climate of hostility generated by the Eisenhower Administration, revision of the Act is more likely to end with the power supply back in utility hands.

So the valley residents are prepared to fight out the present battle on today's prepared trenches.

> From the first gun to the last there was no armistice, no breathing space and no truce. From the beginning to the end there was that irreconcilable conflict between those who believed the national wealth of the United States best can be developed by private capital and enterprise and those who believe that in certain activities related to the national resources only the great strength of the federal government itself can perform the most necessary task in the spirit of unselfishness, for the greatest good for the greatest number.

So wrote George Norris of the struggle to create TVA. Then, as now, $5 million was the price offered by a private trust to take title to the valley's power. Then as now, in Norris' words, "It was said and accepted without question by millions of Americans that private enterprise could do no wrong."

Three years of struggle ended Ford's offer for Muscle Shoals. Three more led to the first TVA bill. President Coolidge killed it with a pocket veto. Norris brought it back to life. President Hoover vetoed it again saying "That is not liberalism; it is degeneration." Congress sustained the veto. But Norris had just begun. He toured the graveyards of the valley, rubbing clean the inscriptions on tombstones to prove that hard labor caused by lack of water and power cut the lives of the valley women short. He linked TVA to a new right—the right of low-income groups to electricity—and to much more. He called TVA the Second Emancipation. Armed with that forward-looking concept he won.

CRITICS of TVA murmur today that it lacks a forward looking concept. They see cheap power as an accepted way of life in the Southeast. They fear that in the new dynamics of industrialization and urbanization, TVA as a center of vision and planning, has not kept ahead. They smile at the President's cry of warning that TVA is creeping socialism and wish that in the broad sense this were true. Local pioneering of course is important in the long run. For the present, however, TVA is still a yardstick for the nation, an inspiration for the world, and for the valley an indispensable part of the status quo. It was a conservative status quo in the days before the New Deal. Then the radicals were those who wished to overturn the status quo on the left. It is a liberal status quo today, and today's radicals are the Eastern bankers and their intellectual children who tear at society's intricate web in the name of rightist doctrines and abstract ideals. Fear of creeping socialism dictated the letter to Dear Stub. But when the President strikes at TVA he hits not the wraith of socialism but the flesh and blood of the farmers, the tradesmen, the businessmen of the valley, the prosperity of free enterprise there rests on cheap power; the basis of family living is on TVA.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Nuclear Physics & Creative Interference

by Eugene Rabinowitch

THIS IS two reporters' story of the development of the H-bomb in America; lively and readable, but superficial and biased; a distorted, black and white picture. In discussing the Oppenheimer case, its authors condemn the Washington press reaction to the Grey Board decision as "a sharp exhibition of one of Washington's widely overlooked evils, handout journalism." An evil it is—but the book of Shepley and Blair is about the worst example of it to come to the attention of this reviewer. Theirs is a book based largely on handouts of confidential (or even secret) information by people—probably somewhere in the military establishment—for whom the restrictions of security do not exist when it comes to gaining support for (or destroying the influence of the enemies of) certain military-strategic concepts (which often means, their lion's share of the defense dollar).

The Hydrogen Bomb: The Men, the Menace, the Mechanism, by James Shepley and Clay Blair Jr. (McKay; $3).

Somebody has once defined the Russian political system under the czars as "absolute monarchy limited by assassination." The security system which has dominated certain important areas in America since 1945 can be defined as "absolute secrecy limited by leaks." Responsible political leaders (with some spectacular exceptions, such as that of Senator Johnson of Colorado in his famous H-bomb television speech), and technical experts and scientists (as far as we know, without exception), take the stamps "secret" or "confidential" seriously—even when they find them foolishly applied; but some Pentagon officials seem to consider themselves above the law, and leak information whenever —and in whatever form—it suits them.

They do this through selected journalistic mouthpieces; and the temptation for reporters to become such mouthpieces is easily understandable. They gain in this way admittance to sanctums of information, impenetrable to their colleagues, and can produce scoops and exposés which establish their journalistic reputation. The price some of them pay for it is abandonment of independent journalistic judgment, which can be based only on access to *all* relevant facts and opinions, and not to a selected and sifted set of them. This abandonment of objectivity is not necessarily conscious; the Shepleys and the Blairs may honestly think of themselves as servants of truth (although in this case, they are very careless servants, since they have not taken the trouble of verifying the picture supplied by their informants, even in the details that are on public record). There lies a grave danger. The excessive secrecy, which has been established in Washington since the war, in particular around anything with the word "atomic" in it, has created an unhealthy situation for the free press; it encourages the manipulation of the press by those in possession of secrets, who are unscrupulous enough to use this possession as a tool in the fight for public and congressional support.

THE BOOK by Shepley and Blair can be read with interest—and even some profit—by those who know how to read propaganda, and are able to recognize the errors, and discount the prejudices of the authors. Such readers can reconstruct from it important "missing links" in the scant official history of the atomic age, and piece together some never-declassified technical information concerning atomic and thermonuclear weapons. In the technical as well as in the historical areas, however, the reader must be cautioned to remain on his guard even when the story sounds plausible, since in the technical field, the understanding of the authors is poor,[1] while their knowledge of historical facts often is either shaky[2] or too easily swayed by the winds of prejudice.

Since this book was published, it has become a kind of competitive sport among best-informed people in the American atomic energy program to see who can make the longest list of errors in it. Most of these errors are either in reporting confidential discussions and decisions, or in describing outright secret technical facts; both kinds cannot be publicly corrected by those in a position to do so. Here are, however, some examples from the reviewer's own list, pertaining to facts in the public domain. These misstatements of facts and misrepresentations of motives, attributed to "scientists" in general, may be innocuous compared to the aspersions which the authors cast upon individual scientists (such as Dr. Norris Bradbury, and his colleagues at Los Alamos), most deserving of the nation's thanks for the development of America's atomic weapons; but they are easier to correct in public, and show clearly the authors' bias and their use of sleight-of-hand in dealing with facts.

On page 4, we read that "US scientists and military intelligence alike were confident that our atomic monopoly will continue for at least three more years and more likely 10." In 1945-46, the most prominent American atomic scientists went on record in warning that American atomic monopoly is unlikely to last for more than a few years. The "Franck Committee Report" (June, 1945); the Congressional testimonies of Szilard, Langmuir, and Bethe, the editorials in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, have predicted that a span of 3-5 years (counting from the Hiroshima explosion), is all the Soviet Union is likely to need to achieve her first bomb. Perhaps, the most specific analysis was given in the article "How Close

[1] A flash on the scientific "competence" of the authors is thrown, for example, when the white streaks left in the air by jet planes are explained as due to the "heat of the jet tail pipe condensing water in the air" (p. 158).

[2] Leo Szilard would read with some amazement (and amusement) the intelligence that he "fled Germany at considerable risk to himself to pass the news [of the discovery of atomic fission] to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen"; equally startling is the information that Max Planck "had just published his theory of quantum mechanics" in 1945 (Planck's fundamental paper on quantum theory had appeared in 1900; quantum mechanics was developed by Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schroedinger, Max Born, P. A. M. Dirac and others around 1925).

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is the Danger," by Seitz and Bethe, in the anthology *One World or None* (1946); they arrived at the conclusion that 1950 was the most likely date for the first Soviet bomb (it actually came off in the summer of 1949).

On page 6, we read "This dangerously naïve intellectual-superiority complex" (meaning underestimation of Russian scientific capabilities) "was particularly strong in the scientific community." The American scientists—because of their first-hand familiarity with scientific production in other countries, including the USSR—have never underestimated Russian science. If there was exaggeration, it was rather in the opposite direction—we recall Dr. Langmuir's assertions upon coming back from the USSR Academy of Sciences celebrations in the summer of 1945, (expressed, for example, in his article in *One World or None*), that the Soviet science is bound to advance more rapidly than the science in the West. A smug "superiority complex" *did* exist—and still exists—in American engineers, and production men (including military engineers, such as General Groves), who could not (and still cannot) imagine Soviet engineering and production methods to be capable of matching the achievements of American technology. (This conclusion is justified when the broad over-all pictures in the two countries are compared, but not when it comes to special areas, in which the Soviet leaders decide to concentrate their best engineering and scientific talent.)

On page 51, the authors say: "In the fighting for civilian *vs.* military control of the atom, Dr. Oppenheimer . . . though originally in favor of the May-Johnson bill . . . switched and helped push through the scientists-sponsored McMahon bill." Dr. Oppenheimer was the one prominent atomic scientist who took no part at all in the 1945-46 campaign for civilian control of atomic energy — and advised other scientists against it.

On the same page we read that the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report" on international control of atomic energy called for construction of atomic facilities within the Soviet Union, "possibly including weapons falicities"; and that it "did not deny the Soviets the veto power in matters relating to atomic energy." Everyone familiar with the Acheson-Lilienthal report (and the "Baruch plan" based on it) knows how misleading these references are. The plan, of course, never contemplated building weapon factories anywhere in the world; and the question of punishment of violators (to which the veto question pertains) was outside the terms of reference of the report.

On page 53: "One goal of the anti-weapons campaign waged by the scientists in Washington in 1945 and 1946, it seemed, was to create the impression that Teller's 'superbomb' was not feasible or practicable." One has to read twice to convince oneself that this fantastic nonsense really is there, black on white. In the first place, the 1945-46 campaign for civilian control of atomic energy was in no way an "anti-weapons" campaign; in fact, one of the most compelling reasons for many scientists to support civilian control was the apprehension that continued Army control might drive good scientists away from the atomic energy program and stifle in this way imaginative work in the weapons field, as well as in other areas. "Teller's superbomb" never was even mentioned in the campaign—in fact, most scientists who took part in it had no knowledge whatsoever that the matter of thermonuclear weapons had been discussed at Los Alamos in 1945. Teller himself (in contrast to Oppenheimer), took an active part in the campaign for civilian control.

On page 170, we read that "nuclear physicists, who had organized after the end of World War II to expiate the 'sin of Los Alamos,' to wrest the atomic bomb away from the military, give its secrets to the world, and bring an end to all wars, were especially annoyed by the specter of SAC" (Strategic Air Command). These accusations are unsupported (and in their incriminating part, unsupportable) by any evidence. The late Senator McMahon, Congressional "Mr. Atom," one of the "angels" in Shepley and Blair's "angels *vs.* devils" story, said shortly before his death (in an interview with the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*) that in all his contacts with atomic scientists since 1945 he had *never* heard any one of them suggest "giving away atomic secrets."

I COULD go on, but these samples should suffice to show how unscrupulously the authors build up their case against American scientists. In further developing their thesis that scientists exercised (and still exercise) a doubtful, if not outright evil, influence on public affairs, Shepley and Blair resort to a technique familiar from anti-Semitic propaganda.

They create the impression that there exists a "scientific community"—akin to "world Jewry"—in the sense of a secret brotherhood, following a powerful leadership, and seeking influence in public affairs to the detriment of national interests. The advice of this group has been, more often than not, suspiciously wrong even in its technical aspects, and more likely than not, motivated by a desire to weaken the United States militarily (and to slow down even our peaceful atomic developments). Whenever a scientist, or a group of scientists, makes a positive contribution, everybody involved is praised by name, as an individual; but whenever a scientist or a group of them advance ideas for which the authors (or their informants) have little sympathy—often merely because the slowly moving military mind needs time to grasp them—they are condemned collectively, as "nuclear physicists," "atomic scientists," "scientific fraternity" or "scientific community."

On page 170, we read, for example, that "by drastically curtailing research and development funds, the scientists [what scientists?] reduced the Air Force fighter development program to a dribble." The reviewer has considerable difficulty conceiving of *any* group of scientists deliberately curtailing their own research funds; but granting, for the sake of argument, such incredible self-sacrifice of Air Force scientists in the cause of weakening American power—why do the authors blame for it "scientists" in general, and not certain individuals—as they do when they apportion praise? Is it too far-fetched to say that they borrow this technique from certain anti-Semites, who demonstrate their "objectivity" by praising individual Jewish achievements while damning "the Jews" as a group?

It is natural, by the way, for "anti-scientists" to find common language with anti-Semites—in both cases, it is a small community, with international connections and a set of not generally understood beliefs and values, speaking an esoteric language, and displaying an irritating intellectual aloofness from the rest of the nation, that offers itself as an easy target to demagogues. The

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analogy can be carried further—as the Jews must have a secret all-powerful leadership, the "Wise Men of Zion," so the scientific fraternity must have their secret general staff—and its existence is in fact revealed to Shepley and Blair's satisfaction by the mysterious letters ZORC, carelessly written on the blackboard by Project Lincoln scientists, but espied there by an "unofficially present" Air Force officer "dressed in civilian clothes"!

THE main thesis of the Shepley-Blair book is that scientists should be prevented from influencing political and strategic decisions, into which they have gratuitously injected themselves since the war. To use a recently suggested formula, "scientists should be on tap, not on top." However, a critical reader of Shepley and Blair's book may decide that they have not proved their thesis; in fact, he can argue that they have proved the opposite, that like Balaam, they went out to damn and ended by praising. This hypothetical reader may note that without the initiative of scientists—not as experts, called in by their military bosses to give answers to technical questions, but as citizens, motivated by their concern with American policy and strategy, and trying to impose their ideas and insight upon the conservative minds of the military and the limited vision of the politicians—American defense would have been in a much worse state than it is now.

Robert Oppenheimer and his colleagues in the General Advisory Committee of the AEC may have been wrong when they considered the H-bomb technically uncertain and strategically of little use (incidentally, the latter point is by no means settled as yet, although the whole book of Shepley and Blair is built upon the assumption that without American acquisition of the H-bomb ahead of the USSR, we would have been facing a military catastrophe); it needed, however, other scientists (Teller and his colleagues) to conceive and press for an alternative; and to do so, they had to be motivated not only by a different scientific intuition, but also by different, but equally active, political and strategic convictions.

The section of the book devoted to the activity of Dr. Louis Ridenour as Air Force Chief Scientist, gives another striking example of what a scientist's initiative and imagination can do to "start things moving" in the stubbornly conservative military world. The military had to be persuaded by scientists that we are in fact entering the age of atomic plenty, and that assignment of atomic weapons for purposes other than bombing of Moscow, Baku and Magnitogorsk is not a conspiracy to protect the Soviet Union from destruction by SAC's bombers. Similarly, the Project Lincoln and Project East River scientists had to persuade the Pentagon that the threat of Soviet atomic air power is real, and that "continental defense" against it, by combined radar detection and automatically controlled fighters, rockets and guided missiles, is both necessary and feasible—and that this program is not another conspiracy to take the funds away from the SAC. (Scientists are still trying to impress on politicians the need for much better home defense of our cities, and the dispersal of our essential industries.) These and other facts, assembled in Shepley and Blair's book, invite the conclusion that it would be a bad day for America when our scientists renounce, under pressure or in disgust, all creative interference with the shaping of our national policy and military strategy.

Another unintended conclusion which can be drawn from Shepley and Blair's story is that "scientists" are not a single group, with uniform opinions, but disagree between themselves—as much as generals or politicians do—about the best weapons program or best political plans. Shepley and Blair see this division as a simple split: they divide the scientists into a majority of fuzzy-minded (if not disloyal) pink-tinged internationalists, working deliberately or unintentionally against America's interests, and a few shining "white knights" who clearly recognize the Soviet threat and devote themselves to strengthening American power.

It was the former ones, according to Shepley and Blair, who pressed for civilian rule and international control of atomic energy (intended as a device to give away American atomic secrets and accelerate atomic arming of Russia); it is they who at first opposed, and then sabotaged the H-bomb development; it is they who now frighten the public with terrible pictures of what the use of these bombs in a future war will mean —a horror propaganda intended to weaken the will of the American people to entrust their security to SAC and "massive retaliation," and to employ the most powerful weapons at their disposal to repel Communist aggression—whatever the consequences. The "white knights" are, by implication, innocent of all such activities.

The truth, however, is much more complex. In the first place on many of these questions, there was (and is) a far-reaching unanimity of opinion among scientists belonging to both groups—a unanimity based primarily on the scientist's respect for facts, however disagreeable. On such questions as the probable speed of Soviet atomic progress; the feasibility of Soviet atomic air attack on America (and the consequent need for "continental defense," civil defense and dispersal); the extent of destruction in an atomic war (and the consequent desirability of controlled elimination of atomic weapons); the technical requirements for such control; the dangers of the radioactivity spread by large A- and H-bombs and even the ultimate necessity of a supranational authority to enforce peace in an atomic age—on all these questions, scientists either have the same opinions, or disagree only in matters of emphasis, degree, and timing, without endangering their common understanding.

THIS community of views does not prevent them from disagreeing about what is the best thing to do right now, how to cope with the situation on hand, the terrible dangers which they all recognize. Their positive or negative attitude toward the development of thermonuclear weapons in America (or any other matter of current policy) cannot serve as a clue to their general attitudes (as the authors try to show)—for example, whether they are more or less internationally minded, or whether their appraisal of Soviet Union is more or less negative. Scientists divide not into two groups—the "internationalists" and the "patriots," the "fuzzy-minded" and the "clear-thinking" ones, as Shepley and Blair suggest; rather—beyond their common understanding of the tragic facts of the atomic age—they present a wide spectrum of opinions. They are probably more individualistic in their views than members of any other group—the way people trained to think independently, to accept no ready-made programs, and to follow their own intuition and logical thinking, are bound to be.

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Wallops in Autobiography

by Padraic Colum

SEAN O'CASEY in *Sunset and Evening Star* is cantankerous, intolerant, unfair, and dogmatic—in a word, cornaptious. Moreover, he is discourteous: as his one-time mentor, Yeats, no doubt told him, one should be brave in battle, truthful to one's friends and courteous always. A fellow dramatist went to interview Sean in his Devonshire home. He spoke of him as the greatest of living Irish dramatists. As a living Irish dramatist myself, I thought that was extremely handsome. But did it mollify the subject of the interview? Not a bit. In the present volume he belabors Denis Johnston through half a chapter. He casts Merrion Square "the G.H.Q. of Irish civility" at him. He is certain that the said Denis must have felt really ill by having to sit for hours in a room (O'Casey's) where Giorgione and Gaugin almost shook hands with each other. Of course he belabors other persons, too, but as these are authors and prelates and not people who have come before him in his house or garden they suffer their occupational risk.

Sunset and Evening Star, by Sean O'Casey (Macmillan; $4.75).

But what about the woman who expects sympathy because her busband has been pulled into oblivion by the OGPU? Sean O'Casey doesn't believe her and tells her frankly that he doesn't. Then, he watches the nicknamed lady and her two supporters "go down the garden path where the hollyhocks nodded to them, and red, cream, and mauve dahlias whispered a word for beauty to them, but the three dames passed sourly, giving no sign by any pause that they felt color and line and form touching the hems of their garments." Well, if any of us felt we had reason to believe that a husband or wife was at the mercy of any OGPU that's very like the way we'd walk down a garden path. An unreasonable man, Sean O'Casey. And unreasonable because his personal life dominates his private and social life. A happy family life takes care of his private life, but he brings his personal life into the world of social relations, and that makes for the outrageous judgments that are so freely scattered through *Sunset and Evening Star*.

But don't let the opening of this review give you the notion that it is a book to shrug off. Far from it. Its impact can be felt. And the impact of the six volumes of autobiography of which *Sunset and Evening Star* is the last, when taken together have not only an impact but a wallop. Perhaps it is in this that as an autobiographer O'Casey is a breed to himself.

BUT the wallop is by no means all that O'Casey has. In these volumes as in his Dublin plays there is a quality, an essence, that makes them different from the biographical writing of any other author. It is not neighborliness in the present-day sense of that word; if the word "sib" had remained one might exalt "gossip" to convey this quality—the quality of *proximateness*, of bringing people, liked or disliked, close to us; it is a quality that could be developed only by a people who watch and listen to those whose living space impinges on theirs; there is probably a word in Irish for it, one related to *seanchas*, the talk by the fireside as conducted by a knowledgable elder.

Take, in the present volume, his presentation of the fading and the passing away of Bernard Shaw. Only the distance of the parish is between the two.

> He said he'd like to say goodbye to her. She went back, sat down by his bedside, and with a lovely smile that flashed back into his face the younger Shaw to view again, he said, Goodbye, Eileen, goodbye; give my love to all the O'Caseys. She lingered there over the goodbye, till the great, tired soul sank into sleep again, a deeper sleep than before; then she stole from the room and left Shaw's Corner, and left the great householder in sleep, that he might be free to go forth to meet death, to give death welcome, and see death bow before his greatness.

It is the way a bard or a ballad-singer would speak over his champion—"Och, Shaun O'Dwyer na Glanna!" "And down the line with looks divine he rode the Oul' grey Mare!"

If I may plagiarize a bit from a former article of mine I should say that Sean O'Casey's autobiographical writing reminds me of an Irish sculptored cross of the tenth century. Circle, panels and shaft are crowded with figures so that one feels that any form that has taken the sculptor's eye is given a place. The figures are raised, and, without detail, lifelike. In the memoir as on the sculptored cross some of them seem to be unpurposely placed. Consider the old fellow in a public garden who knows his place in society, and the American sentry before a camp in Devonshire. Whether they belong intrinsically or not we don't know: they are there like the cat and the cock on the cross and they make a place for themselves in our memory.

> The old fellow leaned back on the bench, and crossed one leg over the other. Never before had Sean seen these old legs crossed. While sitting with his lady-friends, the old man invariably sat upright, his legs demurely kept together, divided only by the walking stick thrust down between them. Now the bottom of a trouser leg was stretched high over a shoe, and Sean saw he was wearing a pair of vivid purple socks. The old face was almost handsome, gentle-wrinkled, still young-looking, the white hair and whiskers alone calendaring his age; a face, though, made too soft and pleasant by the torpor of submissive manners.

and:

> He wasn't a big fellow; rather one of the smaller men of the detachment; thin, too, but wiry and firm in his stand. His face was thin, made to look thinner by the enveloping steel helmet. His nose stretched down, thin and long, coming down more than half way over his upper lip. The biggest mark in his face were the big, brown, wide-open eyes that gently and quietly stared out from under the long thin face; eyes that saw little outside what they had already seen at home.

In this book opinions are handed out with the smallest amount of tolerance. But behind the bristle of opinion there is a conviction: men, women and children have an inheritance in the beauty of the earth, and on every level—personal, social, political, religious—our plans should be directed to safeguarding it. Amongst the opinions is one that gives Stalin the first place in this guardianship—"the upright Stalin, full-faced, handsome, jovial." But there's no arguin' with Sean O'Casey.

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A Satirical Weekly is Reborn

by Arnold J. Heidenheimer

THE great German satirical weekly, the *Simplicissimus,* is back in business. In its periods of glory the *Simpl* had been a great force in German letters. Around the turn of the century it printed the early work of writers like Thomas Mann, Frank Wedekind, Ludwig Thoma and Rainer Maria Rilke. Good writing and brilliant cartooning was the formula that drew imperial Germany's attention to the magazine founded in Munich in 1896.

It had also drawn the attention of the censors and the police. For the *Simpl* had immediately turned its literary and artistic scorn on all that was stupid or gross in German life—the monoclad, fatuous "Burschen" and "Alte Herren" of the duelling fraternities, the nobility and the officers. Even the monarchy was not spared, even after several editors had been given short prison sentences for committing an unforgivable act of "lésé majesté."

Chief force on the magazine from its founding until 1933 was a brilliant cartoonist, Thomas Heine; but there were many other outstanding artists including Rudolf Wilke, Kaethe Kollwitz (an occasional contributor) and Karl Arnold. Fortunately neither the editors nor the artists were aware of the fact pointed out by the editor of a recent collection of *Simplicissimus* cartoons (Eugen Roth: *Simplicissimus: Ein Rueckblick auf die Satirische Zeitschrift,* Fackeltraeger Verlag, Hanover) namely that repressive imperial Germany was after all an ideal of liberalism in comparison to what came later. For Heine and his colleagues, neither the clergy, monarchy nor bureaucracy, nor the all-pervading Reserve-officer or "Spiessbuerger"-mentalities were a desirable or essential aspect of German life.

With the outbreak of World War I, however, the *Simpl,* like so many other German opposition organs, lost its critical faculties. Where German Social Democracy supported the Kaiser on the theory that his was a crusade against the reactionary Czar of the Russians, the *Simpl* reorientated its editorial policy so nationalist satire might help win the war for German culture.

After Versailles the magazine never quite regained its power or brilliance. Heine, Arnold, Olaf Gulbransson, Erich Schilling and two other of the veteran cartoonists had won complete control of the paper and were apathetic toward new talent. It kept an even political keel and slashed out at all the extremists. It has been attacked for not taking the Nazis seriously enough, but it kept up a fairly continuous cartoon fire at them, and at those who gave the movement aid. One of Heine's sharpest cartoons of the period takes off at the Jewish members of the Berlin stock exchange who in 1930 helped present Hitler with an *Ehrenprotektorat.* But the later Weimar period identified political altercation to a pitch where satire was no longer much of a weapon. Neither the political street gangs nor the demoralized parliamentarians much cared any longer for what the *Simplicissimus* would say of them.

The final disaster for *Simplicissimus* came with Hitler's accession to power in 1933. Several of the artist-owners who had become dependent on the magazine for good incomes, had for some time moderated their political attitudes. But even Heine, a Jew, did not anticipate that the Nazis would dare threaten the well-established magazine. The revelation came when Julius Streicher, the Nazi Gauleiter, called the editors in to talk terms. Heine and Franz Schoenberner fled the country. Of the others Schilling became a convinced Nazi, while Arnold, Gulbransson and most of the rest of the staff continued to work for what became an organ of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. It continued printing until September, 1944.

The Crown Prince's First Mountain Goat

Now, ten years later, like the phoenix from the ashes, *Simplicissimus* has reappeared. It carries none of the old names. Heine died in Sweden in 1948 still convinced that his former colleagues had tried to betray him to the Nazis. Gulbransson is now over eighty, and has returned to Munich to exhibit and sell the fashionable sketches that he did for the "old" *Simplicissimus.* The appearance of the "new" *Simpl* puts an effective end to the recriminations between emigrés and stay-behinders that hovered over the corpse of the old.

But can the new *Simplicissimus* live, or rather can it exist as a satirical weekly? The first few issues show no clear political or literary policy, nor do they show immediate promise of genius. The basic question is whether the German artist can create good satire and whether the German readers will laugh at it if they get it. Can the German artist whom experience has taught to appreciate distinctions between greater and lesser evils, get very riled up about the overbearing mannerism of a new German army officer. Or will he just say: "Well he's not as bad as the ones I used to have in the 'Kommiss' back in '43-'44, and he's even probably a shade better than the ones over there in the East Zone"?

Another question is whether the German rulers will continue to be farsighted enough to allow or encourage frank criticism. Even as thoughtful a statesman as Adenauer has seriously toyed with creating forms of press censorship. Will his successors, less confident of themselves and of the rightness of their policies, tolerate sharp criticism from the scribblers in Munich? Many a German would feel less uneasy in the new period of rearmament and national flexing of muscle if he knew that another Heine or Rilke were keeping watch that the strong right arms are kept properly gloved.

Notes on the Critics

EUGENE RABINOWITCH is the editor of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* PADRIAC COLUM's newest book is a collection of poems. ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, a former *NR* staff writer, is now freelancing in Europe.

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THEATRE

'In mildest sunshine Jacob Apfelboeck/ Murdered his father—mother too withal —/And shut them both up in the laundry chest/And had to sit alone here in the hall . . . " On my way to see Maxwell Anderson's *The Bad Seed*, I found myself muttering a ballad by Brecht, for the theme of the homicidal child is a traditional source of quiet fun; and, arriving at the 46th St. Theatre, I found that the director Reginald Denham showed himself willing and able to continue the tradition. The lighting points up an open window through which someone is—or is not?—listening. The action is full of odd little falls, one of them broken by a man screaming as he catches fire and burns to death, another by the slight sound of the falling curtain as we gape appalled (well, almost) on the devilish child who sits angelically reading her story book.

The Bad Seed, by Maxwell Anderson; adapted from the novel by William Marsh (46th St. Theatre).

Little Rhoda Penmark is distinctly pushy: she pushes an old lady downstairs, and a little boy off the wharf. She it is, too, who set fire to the screaming hired man. And her mother, not wanting to turn over the child to the law, has become her accomplice. A Big Situation! Can it be resolved by having mother murder little Rhoda and then commit suicide? The idea seems to promise further innocent merriment. Rhoda takes the overdose of pills. A shot rings out; mother's a goner. When the lights go up again, we are all set for a double funeral. But suddenly the piano starts up in the next room. The touch is Rhoda's, the tune too. Enter Rhoda. Second and last Big Situation! None of the survivors know anything of Rhoda's misdeeds: She is a girl most likely to succeed—in repeating them *ad infinitum*.

Now, I like that sort of thing, especially the trick ending in which the audience is misled into believing that Rhoda is dead. This is to toy with human affairs with an outrageousness that might yield farce as good as a Marx Brothers film or melodrama as good as a Humphrey Bogart—if ever the day should come when the stage might aspire to the rank of the screen at its best. And most of *The Bad Seed* is good theatre. One bit, indeed, is so good that it almost damages the rest. I refer to a couple of scenes played by Eileen Heckart as the mother of the murdered little boy. One of the nicest things in theatre is the way in which a superb performance in a small role can suddenly leap out of the general competence of a production. To act a bereaved mother is easy, and the actress does not live who wouldn't—or even who couldn't—do it like a shot. To act a bereaved mother *in a play that isn't serious* is something else again. Here, it will be important not, as it were, to be too bereaved; and yet to be bereaved; it isn't easy. This bereaved mother, the script dictates, has taken to drink. Now, "doing a drunk scene" *is* notoriously easy; it is so easy that it is seldom well done by men and, by women, almost never; actresses either don't get drunk, or don't remember it, and, if they see other people drunk, they turn too quickly away. . . . Well, Miss Heckart solves her problem. Whether by painstaking calculation or true intuition, she has worked out a series of stances and movements, of accents and intonations, which are right for this character in this play. Her bereavement is made real enough; it is also left unreal enough. Her drunkenness is funny enough; it is also ugly enough and sad enough. There are plenty of actors to give us quantity—of pathos or whatever; vehemence goes naturally with the actor's temperament. But those with the art to balance this against that and to leave off when the "enough" point is reached are very few.

That some of the other actors in *The Bad Seed* do not hold the balance so finely between seriousness and frivolity may not, however, be their own fault. I know nothing of the novel this play is based on, but, taking the play for what it is, I had the impression of an author intermittently and mistakenly trying to be serious. God knows there is a serious play in this material! "What should a mother do?" Shades of Mrs. Alving! The moment the playwright points with any earnestness at a real mother who becomes the accomplice of her homicidal daughter he is giving himself a problem play to write. Though, in general, Mr. Anderson resisted this temptation, he had an occasional twinge of earnestness and, in effect, asked the actors kindly to practice another style for a few moments. For example, the actor playing Rhoda's father has suddenly to create the emotion a man really feels when his wife kills herself; luckily, he fails; but we are embarrassed at his embarrassment. The father's is a tiny role, but Nancy Kelly, playing the mother, was on the spot. The twinges of earnestness were written, mainly, into her part. What could she do? Shuttle constantly between one style—that is, one world—and another? The evening I saw her Miss Kelly seemed to be—not quite desperately but still nervously—trying to keep up appearances. When an actor is uncertain about a part as a whole, he falls back on his "technique" and "personality" and hopes that, if he applies these to all the details taken separately, he can blind the audience to that central uncertainty, that fundamental flaw. I have no means of knowing for sure if Miss Kelly was working somewhat on these lines; I certainly had the impression she was; and so the details she did work on struck me as mannered and actressy; there was even a disturbing echo of another actress—Uga Hagen—in some of the movements and, even more, in the break in the voice, here without meaning.

I have heard it said that Mr. Denham's directing is cheap and old-fashioned but, in the present context, the remark is no derogation. This kind of show is by rights a little cheap, and our real complaint, if we have one, should be against the Playwrights Company for trying excessively to uncheapen it with a physical production that, figuratively and perhaps literally, is too expensive by half. It is as if they wanted to create *Sabrina Fair* when was indicated was another *The Bat*—or should we simply say another Reginald Denham spine chiller? As for old-fashionedness, in melodrama there is a strong case for it. In modernizing melodrama with psychology and sophistication, we are losing the real guts of the beast.

A word of praise should go to Evelyn Varden for the bright color of her playing in the part of a landlady to whom, by the way, Mr. Anderson gave some very amusing lines of quasi-intellectual chatter about Freud and what not.

ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Along for the Ride

SIRS:

The article "How Strato Is Your Streak?" in the December 13 issue really got me up in arms. Being a student in the field of advertising, I felt as though I should say a few words in defense of the "people" (advertising executives) that advertise what the public actually wants to buy.

Advertising is not engaged for the purpose of helping to sell articles which are not wanted by the public. Selling in print is used for the purpose of speeding goods from the producer to the consumer.

The amazing growth of the automobile industry in the United States indicates that they know what the consumer wants.

During the four years I have been at college, I have operated a Model A (99% functional). If you can show me that you are still driving a Model T (100% functional), I will be most happy to arrange a trade. In 20 days, my car will be eligible for the Antique Car Club of America and it is valued at $500.

However, I would be willing to bet that the last time any of your staff *rode* in a Model T was in 1927.

ROBERT F. KIMBALL
University of Rhode Island

• • •

SIRS:

I enjoyed your editorial, "How Strato is Your Streak?" but was greatly disappointed, too, that you kissed off such an important subject in a manner befitting characters like Fred Othman.

There was a time when a guy could appeal to *The Readers Digest* to expose 'em, but *RD's* working for money only these days, too. So *New Republic* looks like one of the last courts of appeal, and here's the appeal:

Please do a piece on the auto industry.

Here's a couple of items to get you started:

1. Did you know that on Oldsmobile's 1954 models (the car that was a year ahead of itself) most of the rear ends were faulty? Of course you didn't, unless you bought one. The Olds people call it the universal joint spline (whatever that is). I had to have mine repacked with grease every thousand miles or so for the first few thousand miles. Then they gave up on this, saying the factory had prepared "kits" which would solve the dilemma. That was two months ago, I'm still waiting for the "kit." Meantime, there are strange ominous rumblings back under where I sit.

2. Have you noticed how none of these General Motors babies, or most of the others for that matter, never talk about gasoline mileage anymore? I get around 12 miles to the gallon in my 1954 Olds. Friend of mine has a new Buick which goes about nine miles per gallon.

General Motors, to Arthur Godfrey, is the greatest name in American industry. God pity the rest of industry. My last two cars have been GM masterpieces. Previously I owned a Pontiac which had a high-compression knock from the time I took it out of the showroom. Never got it fixed. Each new car I've bought in recent years has had at least a half dozen things wrong with it.

How 'bout doing a piece on these money-grabbers?

DON STULL
Columbus, Ohio

• • •

SIRS:

"How Strato is Your Streak?" was a funny, interesting editorial until I got to the last few paragraphs. Do you *really* believe that present-day machines are designed without *too* much thought to comfort? And as for colors, have you forgotten that these cars are probably styled *by* women *for* women with a Hollywoodish pair of "tomato and pink" glasses?

I know of "a good Model A Ford with good tires and a heater," but the man won't part with it.

PFC. PEP BOVA
Army Chemical Center, Maryland

• • •

SIRS:

Your editorial "How Strato is Your Streak?" hits the real problem exactly. The new cars with their fancy features don't have the things on them that users not only need, but want. In the effor to outbid each other in needless speed—illegal and useless speed, in fact—the ca makers have calmly forgotten wha would really help. So I think I'll stay with my 1953 Plymouth till I wear it out—hoping that some maker will get some hunch to meet wants of customers like myself meantime.

The 1955 cars are practically all deficient in headroom inside, and hardly any will let the front seat move far enough back for real straight-leg comfort in driving. (Even my '53 does this only at the expense of leg room for rear seat passengers.)

You'd think the makers would have discovered by now that with the roads progressively more crowded, it would be good medicine to shorten overall lengths steadily, year after year, instead of increasing them.

STEPHEN G. RICH
Verona, New Jersey

► Luce's Promised Land

SIRS:

I have been appreciating the *New Republic* for several years, in silence, bu now I must voice this appreciation tc tell you that the December 6th issue is sensational!

But the honors go to the 40th Anniversary Address, as given by Henry R. Luce, with introduction by Michael Straight. That speech, "The Promised Land," is a classic, and deserves wide distribution by *New Republic* readers and subscribers.

MRS. MABEL ROBELE
Whittier, California

• • •

SIRS:

Please let me comment on the lyrical optimism of Mr. Henry Luce, in his speech at your 40th Anniversary Dinner, which I have read in your Dec. 6 issue. "Astonishing state of affairs," "a radical revolution in a basic equation of human life on earth,"—and all we need is a little "spirituality," to enable us to handle "a national income of 500 billion dollars in 1964"! To argue this out would require a book, so I will just *tell* Mr. Luce, as follows:

We have a war economy, which exists by and for the production of war goods. At present we are spending 35 billions a year on the production of useless things, and if we stopped tomorrow, our economy would collapse overnight,

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nd our creeping Socialism would start alloping. Our economy of production or profit survives only on condition nat we fight a big war every quarter entury, and the wars get bigger and he intervals shorter as we go along. World War I saved us from another ollapse like 1907-9, and World War I saved us from another like 1929-33. The wars destroy enormous quantities of useful goods, thus making it necesary to produce all over again; they nflate the currency, and distribute it widely, thus giving the profiteers a chance to gather it all up again. Nobody wants war, but everybody wants what war gives them, and we gild the image of Mammon and call it spirituality.

Mr. Luce tells us that "Norman Thomas is fond of saying that practically everything he stood for when he entered politics has been accomplished." Well, Norman, you didn't ask for enough. Start asking for more—and start quickly!

UPTON SINCLAIR

Corona, California

► Greetings from Edmund Wilson

SIRS:

The *New Republic* has, without my knowledge or consent, reprinted an old article of mine in its anniversary number. I do not want my name associated in any way with the paper in its present form, which I regard as having no continuity with the *New Republic* of Herbert Croly, on which I had the honor to work.

EDMUND WILSON

Wellfleet, Massachusetts

In the letter which accompanied the above, Mr. Wilson explains that he is not familiar with the present-day New Republic, *that he does "not know what is now being done with it, because I never see it."* —The Editors

► The Senator as Historian

On page 14 of the November 29 *NR* is the statement that McCarthy referred to Teddy Roosevelt's courage in facing up to the Barbary pirates. Who's wrong, Joe or your writer? The Barbary business was in 1801, fifty-seven years before T.R. was born.

HENRY CASTOR

Corte Madera, California

It is the Senator's fault; that is what he said.—The Editors

► The Fatal Fallacy

SIRS:

Reader J. F. Golay of Virginia in his answer to Michael Straight (*NR*, December 13) reveals the fatal fallacy which trapped too many sincere opponents of one form of totalitarianism.

"I was ready to join with Communists or anyone else—*even Tories like Churchill* (I've added the italics) to resist the Hitlers, Francos and Mussolinis of the world. . . . I would do exactly the same again."

To mention Communists on the same plane with Churchill is one serious error but to compound that fallacy with the naïve belief that Communists really oppose evil in the world is suicidal.

Whether it be racial discrimination, abuse of civil liberties, problems of housing and rent control or, more specifically, whether it be a strike in Gastonia, the Scottsboro Case, Franco, Hitler or McCarthy—they are all merely means to an end to be exploited for the Communist cause of the moment. This myth which dies so hard—that one can co-operate with Communists in realizing legitimate ends—has caused much mischief.

There must be and are those with longer memories than J. F. Golay who can recall the cynical Soviet betrayal of the POUM in Spain and the vivid, lewd spectacle of the Soviet-Nazi love pact—prelude to World War II.

MICKEY LEVINE
National Vice-Chairman
American Veterans Committee
New York City

► Red Design for the Americas

SIRS:

I write this to correct major errors of fact in Betty Kirk's review of my book, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude,* in your December 20th issue.

Miss Kirk says that in my book I predicted that the Marines would have to be sent to Latin America if Communist penetration gets much worse. I made no such prediction anywhere in the book, and challenge Miss Kirk to produce the exact quotation. . . . What I did write in my book is that the continued growth of Communism could lead to war in the Americas, as it already has in Guatemala —a statement quite different from the one Miss Kirk attributes to me.

Miss Kirk says, in reference to me, that "he declares that the United States did not actively intervene in the Guatemalan Civil War." Again, I made no such statement. If Miss Kirk had at least glanced at my very last chapter she would have noted four paragraphs that begin with the phrase, "We intervened . . ." describing in detail what I thought US intervention consisted of. I summed up the nature of our intervention as follows: "What the United States did was to *intervene against foreign intervention,* in order to restore Guatemala's national sovereignty." Miss Kirk may disagree with that conclusion, which is her privilege; but it is stretching that privilege when she tells readers that I wrote that we did not intervene.

Miss Kirk says that I did not account "for the ineffectiveness of our own representatives in the Central American and Caribbean areas for the past ten years," as a factor contributing to the advance of Communism in Guatemala and elsewhere. May I remind Miss Kirk that I devoted a whole chapter, "The 'Colossus' and the Communists," as well as parts of the final chapter on the "The New American Era," to the very issue of US policy in Latin America. I wrote that our attitude has "oscillated between extremes of indifference and alarm." And I also reported—in answer to her needless query as to why we weren't warned of developments in Guatemala early enough—that Ambassador Patterson in 1948 and Will Lissner of the *Times* in 1950 warned of impending trouble, but were not heeded by the State Department or the public. She can find that information on pp. 294-5.

I shall not attempt to deal with the several contradictions and distortions contained in Miss Kirk's review, which it is her privilege to indulge in without benefit of an author's reply.

New York City DANIEL JAMES

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Jingle the Bells

A Merry Christmas from the *New Republic*
To the mighty and minor who make up our public:
Kingsley Martin, Clem Attlee, Healey and Low,
U Nu, Nguyen, Nehru and Gimo,
G. Bromley Oxnam and Malcolm Cowley,
(Add an extra sprig of Christmas holly)
For Mrs. Elmhirst, Gracie Pfost, Mrs. F. D. R.,
Elmer Davis, Paul Douglas, the UN, Mark Starr,
Geoffrey and Bob Wagner, Oveta Culp Hobby,
Padraic Colum and the Labor Lobby.
Sing a taradiddle
For our favorite Biddle,
For Scelba, Fanfani,
Trumpets, timpani.
Up cups Mrs. Tobey, Marshall Field, Ben Cohen
And you newsstand readers (names unknown).

Let us jingle the bells for Irvin Shapiro,
Wil Binkley, Irv Brant, (the historical fellows),
Sid Hyman, Gus Tyler and TVA's Clapp,
Schlesinger (pere, fils), Meany and Lapp;
The *Posts*, all of them, from D. C. to St. Louis
As well as the gentleman replacing Tom Dewey.
All the best to Harry, Margaret and Bess,
Not forgetting Bruce Bliven whom also we bless;
Likewise G. Seldes, F. Perkins, TRB,
Dean Acheson, Eric Bentley, and V. O. Key,
Bells for Gorrell, Joe Frank, Gerald Johnson,
The MCs and Senators (except from Wisconsin),
Atoms-for-peace-plans, Dwight Eisenhower,
Alice Toklas, Ed Murrow, and Adenauer.
Pax Domini Hell's Canyon and all other dams,
Symington, Soapy, and of course Mr. Sam.

Long years to Humphrey, Walter Goodman, Herblock,
Lehman, Kefauver, Lister Hill, Arthur Krock,
Sparkman, Lippmann, Bob Nathan, Dave Riesman,
Sevareid, Costello, Tom Phillips, Miss Fleeson.
A toast to Dick Bolling, Flanders, John Knight,
Sid Yates, John Moss, Jack Javits, Walter White,
Alan Barth and the Friendlys (Al and Jean),
Mark Childs, Scotty Reston and analyst Bean.
Felicitations Lillian Owen, Rachel (Dan) Bell,
Arnold (Thurman) and Arnold (Mel),
Committees, including Cultural Freedom,
George Kennan, Lewis Mumford, Anthony Eden,
Case of New Jersey, Mendès of France, Tito,
UNICEF, UNESCO, NATO, SEATO,
UWF, AVC, FOA, PCA,
WHO, GATT, ADA, MVA,
CIO, AFL, ACLU,
REA, the Amalgamated, ILGWU.

Wassail to Rockefeller and Ford Foundation,
Would that we all were exempt from taxation.
To *NR's* literati, a Praetorius carol,
Irving Howe, Delmore Schwartz, Fiedler, Jarrell,
Likewise valiant publishers who stay in the red,
(Most of them slicing their overhead)—
New Leader, Commonweal, Progressive, Nation,
May one and all increase their paid circulation.
A joyous time on this Christmas day
To Grove, Random House, Doubleday,
Harpers' and Viking, Simon and Schuster,
Knopf and Scribners, all those that useta
Sell books in these pages in bygone ages.
(To the Reuther's and their guaranteed annual wages.)
Add a laurel wreath for Frankfurter and Black;
For newly-wed Douglas, a haversack.
A card we now place on the mantleshelf,
Saying love thy Niebuhr as thyself.
A kiss-and-make-up note to Richard Crossman.
Edmund Wilson, Teller (and Tammany's Boss-man).
Joyeux Noel, Paul Butler, Bill Blair,
Norman Thomas, Barkley, Upton Sinclair.
Salutations, Adlai, Steve Mitchell and Herberg, Sir
Winston, Paul Hoffman and Senator Neuberger.
Dan Mebane, Wayne Morse, Mrs. Smith of Maine,
FULbright, E. B. White, Kathleen Raine,
Maugham, Viet Nam and Roger N. Baldwin
Ralph Bunche, Dan James, Wild Bill Mauldin.
To one and to all a Christmas Cheer,
And a Happy, Healthy, Hopeful New Year!

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